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Volume 15 No. 2 Winter 1990 
The Belden Center f or Private Enterprise Education 
Harding University School of Business 
Searcy, Arkansas 
Ownership Makes a Difference 
NEW BOOKLET PUBLISHED 
Marking the Fifteenth Anniversary of the En-
trepreneur is a new booklet, " HIGH OCTANE? 
A Primer on the Economics of the Energy 
Crisis.'' Authored by Belden Center Director Dr. 
Don Diffine, a complimentary copy of " HIGH OC-
TANE?" is available to our readers upon request. 
Here are a few select paragraphs from the 
introduction: 
In the late 1970's, the service station 
attendant said, "Fill it up?" Reluctant-
ly, I replied, " Fill it up." He opened the 
cash drawer and said, " Fill it up." I fill-
ed it up. Then he filled my gas tank, 
doubling the value of my old, gas 
guzzling car. 
Today, those high gas prices again 
make us feel as if we are "paying 
through the hose." Aside from trying to 
face the current energy crisis with a 
sense of humor, fact is, gas is $1 more 
per gallon in Canada - $2 more in 
parts of Europe. 
Have we been " fuelish"? Not really. 
We have grown 54% in real GNP since 
1973; and we did it with only 9% more 
energy. We're not "energy pigs" any 
more than our children whom we push 
to go on in school are "education pigs." 
Other sections in "HIGH OCTANE?" are titled, 
"The Sun Will Still Rise .. . Oil In The Family ... How 
Many Crises? .. . Creative Juices Will Flow ... Energy 
Facts Of Life In A Nutshell .. . Pay Your Money -
Take Your Choice." 
by David M. Johnson, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor of Accounting 
Harding University 
The undeniable shift from nationalized economies to 
privatized economies throughout Europe is a dream 
becoming reality. Over the past few years, industrial-
ize? _nations of the Free World have been pursuing 
policies to unshackle industry from counterproductive 
government involvement. The theorists and 
philosophers will continue to argue, but for most of us, 
the evidence is in: private ownership is a survivor. 
Addressing this issue, R. Joseph Monsen and Ken-
neth D. Walters have written a book, "Nationalized 
Companies: A Threat to American Business," which 
outlines the tremendous failure of government owner-
ship at the test of profits and losses. By their account, 
"the history of nationalized companies is written in red 
ink." A few of their interesting findings are summarized 
below. 
In the period 1972-1981, the majority of the 25 largest 
state-o':"ned industrial firms in Western Europe reported 
losses in most years. The problem was growing by the 
end of that period, with twice as many losers as win-
ners. Furthermore, losses increased in size as the 
decade wore on. These losses cannot be discounted 
by arguing that these were depressed industries, for 
they included basic manufacturing industries such as 
chemicals, plastics, paper, aluminum, machine tools, 
and fertilizers. In contrast, the 25 largest private com-
panies in Europe reported few losses, and only one had 
losses over an extended period. 
As Monsen and Walters explain, the blame for this 
record lies in the confused incentive structure of state-
owned companies. These firms appear to be run for 
political rather than economic reasons, in accordance 
with a goal of maximizing votes rather than shareholder 
wealth. The symptoms are now classic, but the cause 
and the cure are no mystery. The separation of the 
ownership of an asset and control (management) of that 
asset will result in significant problems of resource 
allocation. 
Even as Americans congratulate themselves on the 
ideological triumph of freedom over totalitarianism, a 
trend has occurred on a microeconomic level resulting 
in the separation of ownership and management in 
large U.S. corp~rations. This separation can produce 
problems for the individual firm not unlike those that 
typify nationalized companies. 
A LITTLE HISTORY 
Until the Industrial Revolution, most manufacturing 
and merchandising were conducted via home 
businesses or small shops under the Handicraft 
System; the predominant business forms were the sole 
proprietorship and the partnership. Under this system, 
an individual develops a particular skill to provide goods 
or services that can be sold or exchanged for goods 
or services desired by the producer. The scale of pro-
duction is very small by present standards, although this 
system still dominates in non-industrialized countries. 
With improved transportation and production 
technology, economies occur that encourage the ex-
pansion of operations. As these businesses grow, 
employees are hired. At first, these few employees labor 
under the watchful supervision of the owner, who is 
ever-present and in close touch with the day-to-day 
business operation. 
The entrepreneur's presence gives personality to the 
business, encourages efficiency, and ensures that the 
business is managed for the benefit of the 
manager/owner. But as the business continues to ex-
pand, the entrepreneur is unable to maintain control 
over operations as she once did. With growth comes 
specialization of labor and management. Supervisors 
are hired. At fi rst, they supplement the owner as 
managers, but eventually supplant the manager/owner. 
The Industrial Revolution accelerated this process on 
a grand scale. Until the mid-1800's, the corporate 
organizational form was primarily reserved for public 
works projects such as bridges and canals. Investors 
were composed of those who had a vested interest in 
the project's completion. For example, a barge freight 
line might be compelled to share in the ownership of 
a canal project. But profit-oriented businesses were still 
conducted as sole proprietorships or partnerships. 
With the Revolution, the corporation became the 
preferred form for for-profit businesses. Mechanization 
and mass production methods allowed large-scale 
manufacturing. The necessary large investments in 
plant and equipment required tremendous amounts of 
capital financing. The corporation proved the most ef-
ficient organizational form through which to obtain that 
financing. 
With expansion of the assets under management, 
personal management by the manager/owner was im-
possible. At first, entrepreneurial managers were sup-
plemented by professional managers; but it was only 
a matter of time until professional managers were in 
control. The result is the modern corporation, charac-
terized by a widely dispersed stockholder group. 
The stockholders, with rare exception, are uninvolved 
in day-to-day operations, and management of the firm 
falls to professionals who have very little ownership in-
terest. Management decision-making, formerly the task 
of the entrepreneur, is now the domain of the profes-
sional manager, who likely has no stake in the firm 
whose future he or she is charting. The problems that 
result are collectively referred to as "agency" problems 
because the managers act as decision-making agents 
on behalf of the firm's owners. 
DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM 
Separation of ownership and control of assets has 
the potential to distort the incentives governing the 
firm's decisions, leading to mis-allocation of resources 
similar to that resulting from state ownership. Adam 
Smith recognized the problems of separation of owner-
ship and control, noting in 1776 in " The Wealth of Na-
tions:" 
The directors of such Ooint stock) companies, 
however, being the managers rather of other peo-
ple's money than of their own, it cannot well be 
expected that they should watch over it with the 
same anxious vigilance with which the partners 
in private copartnery frequently watch over their 
own. 
Smith revealed tremendous insight for one so far 
ahead of the day when large corporations would 
dominate the economy. There, in the age of the butcher 
and baker, he predicted the shift of incentives that would 
accompany the rise of the modern corporation. It would 
be over one hundred years before industrialization 
would result in the dilution of manager ownership that 
gave rise to the problem Smith suggested. 
In the early 1930's, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means 
noted an increasing diffusion of corporate ownership 
that left control in the hands of hired managers who had 
little stock ownership. They predicted from this separa-
tion ill consequences for the national economy. 
Private ownership works because the owners, acting 
out of self-interest, provide valuable products and ser-
vices to the consumer, jobs to employees, and tax 
revenues to support public works. Their efforts to max-
imize personal wealth encourage efficient allocation of 
resources to those activities that are desired most by 
consumers. Without it, the profit motive - central to 
the proper functioning of a free market - is absent. 
Further, the owners know that higher risks are, in 
general, rewarded with higher returns. Without the 
critical connection between risk acceptance and return 
enjoyment, the incentive to accept higher risk is absent. 
SEPARATION AND THE INVESTMENT DECISION 
By far the most crucial financial management deci-
sions made by the firm are its investment decisions. In-
vestments will determine the nature and size of the firm, 
as well as its future profitability and long-term viability. 
This decision may be adversely affected by the separa-
tion of ownership and control, resulting in sub-optimal 
investments that fail to maximize firm value. The agen-
cy problems relating to sub-optimal investments may 
be categorized as (1) excess perquisite consumption by 
firm managers, (2) perversion of the incentive to accept 
risk, and (3) perversion of the tendency to devote time 
and effort to the business. The remainder of this arti-
cle provides a discussion of these problems and a sum-
mary of the evidence regarding them. 
EXCESS PERQUISITE CONSUMPTION 
Perquisites - " perks" for short - are non-salary 
employee benefits. Some examples of common perks 
are: health benefits, free or subsidized cafeterias, use 
of a corporate jet or auto, secretarial staff, office, and 
retirement benefits. Some level of perquisites is 
necessary, or at least beneficial to the firm. Excess per-
quisite consumption becomes a problem because we 
all tend to order more when someone else is footing 
the bill. 
Say you and I go out to lunch. If I'm paying, I'll order 
a salad; if you're paying, I'll have the buffet. A basic 
economic principle governs - as the price of an 
economic good falls, consumption of the good rises. 
Suppose that I own 100% of the stock of a company 
that I also manage. I will consume a certain amount of 
perquisites, but I limit those because I know that the 
money comes directly out of my pocket. 
Now suppose that I sell half of my stock to you, but 
maintain managerial control. Those perks which former-
ly cost me $1.00 now effectively cost me only$ .50 ... 
you absorb the other half. In simple economic terms, 
the cost of these perks has just been cut in half, and 
being a sensible individual, I'll increase consumption. 
The increased consumption above the previous level 
represents an additional cost to the business. Note that 
this additional consumption occurred because I am 
receiving the full benefit of the perks but only paying 
half the cost. The net increase in perks results solely 
from separation of ownership and control. 
Whenever popular business magazines feature the 
astronomical salaries and benefits of top management 
groups, they raise questions about agency problems. 
Are these salaries in the shareholders' interests, or are 
they symptomatic of agency problems? Many of us have 
read with disbelief the accounts of how the officers and 
directors of U.S. Steel in the 1970's enjoyed gourmet 
luncheons among silver settings and extravagant fur-
nishings while the company - and the stockholders 
- were losing money hand over fist. Similar conditions 
occurred at Chrysler, but your own experience likely can 
yield more meaningful examples. These serve to remind 
us that agency problems indeed exist in the form of ex-
cess perk consumption. 
REDUCING THE TENDENCY TO ACCEPT RISK 
The second element of the agency problem 
associated with the firm's investments is the tendency 
for managers to avoid risk-taking as their ownership of 
the firm's equity declines. The risk/return tradeoff that 
stockholders face is very different from that of creditors. 
The claims of bondholders on corporate earnings is 
fixed while that of stockholders is residual. The creditor 
does not enjoy the fruits of exceptional performance, 
but may lose his fixed return if performance is sufficient-
ly poor to jeopardize his claims. 
Facing this tradeoff, the creditor will recommend to 
the corporation a relatively conservative course of ac-
tion - slow growth occasioned by minimal risk, with 
few ventures into unfamiliar operations. This is one 
reason that too much debt in the corporate capital struc-
ture is costly to the firm - with debt comes debt 
covenants, some of which restrict the firm's managerial 
flexibility in pursuing new investment opportunities. 
A corporate manager whose compensation is based 
primarily on salary is effectively a creditor of the com-
pany. His fixed salary is by nature a debt claim, and 
barring other counterincentives, we can expect him to 
chart a conservative course for the firm. 
Compensation packages that include stock and stock 
options are adopted in attempts to realign interests of 
managers with those of common stockholders. By mak-
ing managers' compensation (and wealth) dependent 
on the market value of the stock, stockholders hope to 
offset the distorted incentives wrought by ownership-
diffusion. But the only way to truly align manager in-
terests with those of shareholders is to make compen-
sation entirely dependent on the value of the common 
stock. I don't know of any firm that uses such a com-
pensation arrangement. 
A firm that shuns risk will necessarily shy away from 
innovation and new product or market development, 
thereby reducing its ability to compete in a world where 
being in the forefront is critical to survival. Reducing 
the tendency to accept risk may be a tremendous 
malefactor bearing on a nation's ability to compete in 
a high-tech era. 
REDUCING ENTREPRENEURIAL EFFORT 
The third agency problem is closely related to the 
other two. Diluting insider ownership simultaneously 
dilutes the incentives to commit time, effort, and energy 
to the business. The result is a reduction in en-
trepreneurial effort devoted to the business. 
Students in Finance 101 learn on Day One that the 
goal of the firm is to maximize shareholder wealth. For 
the corporation, this translates into maximizing the 
stock's market price. Although some argue that this goal 
is incomplete, most would admit that the firm exists 
primarily for the benefit of its owners, the stockholders. 
Their interests are therefore paramount. 
But modern corporate managers often have been 
labeled "satisficers" rather than "maximizers" of 
shareholder wealth. Maximizing requires choosing the 
best alternative from among those available. Satisfic-
ing requires only that managers attain some minimum 
acceptable result. And since shareholders of widely 
held corporations are not apprised of the alternatives 
facing management, there is no basis by which to judge 
whether managers are maximizing or simply satisficing. 
There is reason to be skeptical that managers volun-
tarily choose to maximize shareholder wealth. Much like 
the "straight-A'' student whose parents take their child's 
consistent top performance for granted, managers find 
that superior performance in one year results first in ap-
probation, but later to increased expectations - or 
demands. Furthermore, if their efforts are not directly 
tied to rewards, then the connection is fuzzy, 
incomplete. 
Return now to the sole owner who sold half-interest 
in his business, and now as a partial owner consumes 
more perks than before. The manager/owner is also in-
clined to consume more leisure time than before; that 
is, he is inclined to exert less effort in the conduct of 
his business. After all, why over-exert oneself when 
others reap much of the benefit? 
"Shirking," the reduction in entrepreneurial effort ap-
plied to the business, applies not only to time devoted 
to the business, but also to creative energies that 
characterize the helmsmen of vigorous, competitive, in-
novative firms. The agency cost here is by nature an 
opportunity loss - the potential wealth foregone by vir-
tue of undiscovered, unpursued investment oppor-
tunities - and may represent the greatest cost of agen-
cy problems. 
DOCUMENTING THE PROBLEM 
Proposing these problems is one thing - document-
ing them is another. For the last ten years or so, much 
research effort has been directed at determining how 
the separation of ownership and control manifests itself 
in corporate financial policies and performance. 
The investment decision reflects the firm's strategy 
and determines its profitability and survivability. An in-
teresting aspect of the investment decision concerns 
the firm's attitude toward corporate diversification via 
mergers and acquisitions. 
Because salaried managers' interests are aligned 
with those of the firm's creditors, they will be interested 
in reducing the riskiness of the firm's investments. One 
way to do so is by diversification. Financial theory holds 
that corporate diversification is of little value to 
stockholders - it is relatively easy and inexpensive for 
individuals to diversify their stockholdings, especially 
with the proliferation of mutual funds. 
In contrast, diversification of real assets is expensive 
and the cost of a mistake is much greater (e.g., diversi-
fying into areas outside management's sphere of ex-
pertise, then having to divest at bargain-basement 
prices for survival's sake - Beatrice a case in point). 
So diversification by the corporation is of questionable 
benefit, at least to stockholders. If the stockholder owns 
a well-diversified portfolio, the failure of one stock would 
have limited adverse impact on her wealth since the 
other stocks would be unaffected and might even 
benefit from the failure. 
To the manager, however, salary represents the 
primary source of income, and the corporation's sur-
vival is a prime determinant of personal wealth. If the 
corporation founders or fails, the manager may find 
himself standing in the unemployment line, the 
possessor of a tainted resume. To reduce this risk, the 
manager may recommend corporate diversification so 
that the corporation's survival is better assured, not be-
ing dependent on the success of a single line of 
business. 
Research aimed at investigating the relationship be-
tween corporate characteristics and the level of 
manager ownership provides interesting evidence on 
the problems outlined above. One study reveals that 
firms with low manager ownership have a tendency to 
carry relatively higher levels of liquid assets (primarily 
cash, marketable securities, and inventories) than firms 
with high insider ownership. A high level of liquid assets 
is usually associated with a conservative, or even defen-
sive, operational policy. This study suggests that firms 
with low manager ownership pursue more conservative 
policies related to investment in working capital than 
otherwise similar firms with high manager ownership. 
Another aspect of the firm's investment decision 
relates to corporate diversification. As explained above, 
diversification is of little benefit to the well-diversified 
stockholder, but may be of great value to the manager 
whose wealth is dependent primarily on the survival of 
the corporation. 
Recent studies suggest that firms with low manager 
ownership pursue conglomerate mergers to a much 
greater degree than of high-manager-ownership firms. 
Conglomerate mergers, by definition , represent com-
binations of unrelated businesses. As a result, synergies 
- where the combined result is greater than the sum 
of the parts - cannot be used as justification for the 
mergers. Instead, they are pursued to obtain greater 
diversification of the firm's operations, and thereby to 
reduce risk. This suggests that the incentives to diver-
sify the firm's operations is different for the firms with 
high manager ownership and those with low manager 
ownership. 
Another recent study finds that managers with small 
amounts of stock ownership are more opposed to 
takeovers of their companies than are managers with 
high amounts of stock ownership. Stockholders of target 
companies usually realize substantial increases in 
wealth as a direct result of takeover attempts; managers 
of firms that are acquired usually are released once the 
acquisition is accomplished. Target company managers 
with small amounts of stock ownership stand to lose 
much in a successful takeover, and try to thwart the 
attempt. 
In summary, evidence suggests that the most crucial 
decision facing financial managers - the investment 
decision - is significantly influenced by the level of 
manager stock ownership. Managers who are not 
owners pursue financial goals which may not be in the 
best interests of stockholders. In general, these policies 
suggest a more conservative attitude than is the case 
for manager-owners. 
MANAGER OWNERSHIP AND RETURN ON 
INVESTMENT 
It is fairly common to find investment advisors who 
recommend stocks of companies on the basis of high 
stock ownership by firm managers. The arguments are 
sensible and, in fact, follow from the suggestions made 
above - managers with high stock ownership have 
greater incentive to work harder, stick their necks out, 
and not waste assets on silly investments. 
Unfortunately, the matter isn't at all clear. Writers who 
propose " evidence" that manager ownership produces 
superior returns usually rely only on a few select ex-
amples. They cite a few cases of successful companies 
where owners are active in management - Sam Walton 
and Wal-mart as an example - and conclude that high 
manager ownership will produce equally superior 
returns in other firms. That may be, but isolated ex-
amples do not a reliable investment rule make. 
Simply stated, empirical evidence doesn't suggest 
any consistent relationship between the level of 
manager ownership and the returns on common stock. 
A number of problems exist in measuring such things, 
most of them concerned with adjusting for the relative 
riskiness of the stocks. Barring a breakthrough in 
developing better measurement tools, the investor 
should be aware that the evidence does not support the 
often-made claim that stocks of high-manager-
ownership firms outperform others. 
CONCLUSION 
Agency theory proposes that the separation of owner-
ship and control in the modern corporation produces 
conflicts of interest within the firm that.lead to manage-
ment decisions that are not in the stockholders' best 
interests. Research suggests that these conflicts pro-
duce problems which are manifested in the firm's in-
vestment policies. 
Many firms have recognized these potential prob-
lems, and have responded by making stock ownership 
and stock option plans a part of the management com-
pensation package. These attempt to realign manager 
and shareholder interests to encourage managers to 
act more like owners. 
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